I n this paper, we quantify the efficiency of decentralized supply chains that use price-only contracts. With a price-only contract, a buyer and a seller agree only on a constant transaction price, without specifying the amount that will be transferred. It is well known that these contracts do not provide incentives to the parties to coordinate their inventory/capacity decisions. We measure efficiency with the price of anarchy (PoA), defined as the largest ratio of profits between the integrated supply chain (that is, fully coordinated) and the decentralized supply chain. We characterize the efficiency of various supply chain configurations: push or pull inventory positioning, two or more stages, serial or assembly systems, single or multiple competing suppliers, and single or multiple competing retailers.
Introduction
Price-only contracts specify a constant per-unit selling price between a buyer and a seller. These contracts are certainly the simplest and the most common mechanisms for governing transactions in supply chains. However, they do not coordinate the supply chain (Cachon 2003) , a manifestation of the "double-marginalization" phenomenon: In a decentralized supply chain with two monopolists, two successive markups occur, causing the final price to be higher and the aggregate profits to be lower than if the firms were vertically integrated (Spengler 1950) . When demand is stochastic and the retail price is fixed, double marginalization is reflected through reduced inventory levels.
The limited performance of price-only contracts was first investigated in two-stage supply chains by Lariviere and Porteus (2001) and Cachon and Lariviere (2001) . It was then analyzed in more complex supply chains, such as assembly systems (Wang and Gerchak 2003 , Gerchak and Wang 2004 , Tomlin 2003 , multitier assembly systems (Bernstein and DeCroix 2004) , distribution systems when demand is stochastic (Anupindi and Bassok 1999 , Cachon 2003 , Bernstein and Federgruen 2005 or deterministic (Chen et al. 2001 , Wang 2001 . However, no formal analysis has accurately quantified the loss of efficiency associated with these contracts.
To improve coordination in supply chains, various alternative contracts have been proposed: buyback, revenue sharing, quantity flexibility, sales rebate, and quantity discount contracts (see Cachon 2003 and Lariviere 1999 for a review). However, these more elaborate contracts are typically more costly to negotiate, more complex to administrate, or might create additional moral hazard problems (e.g., see Krishnan et al. 2004) .
Because of the prevalence of price-only contracts in practice and the additional cost of using more elaborate contracts, it is important to quantify the loss of efficiency associated with price-only contracts. Numerical examples in Cachon (2004) show that the relative efficiency of a two-stage decentralized supply chain could be as low as 70%-85% for push configurations and 75%-90% for pull configurations. But to the best of our knowledge, there has been no formal analysis to quantify the loss of efficiency in decentralized supply chains.
Quantifying the efficiency of a decentralized system relative to the performance of a centralized system has generated a lot of research interest over the past few years. The price of anarchy (PoA)-a concept introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou (1999) and dubbed by Papadimitriou (2001) -measures the ratio of the performance of the centralized system over the worst performance of the decentralized system (corresponding to the worst Nash equilibrium). The PoA has been used as a measure of performance for transportation networks Tardos 2000, 2002; Correa et al. 2004 Correa et al. , 2005 Perakis 2005) , in network resource allocation games (Johari and Tsitsiklis 2004) , and network pricing games (Acemoglu and Ozdaglar 2007) .
In contrast, there has been little research on quantifying the efficiency of supply chains. Chen et al. (2000) quantified the inefficiency due to the bullwhip effect by comparing the variance of orders with the variance of demand; because inventory costs are related to the variance of orders, their work relates to the literature on PoA. Martínez de Albéniz and Simchi- Levi (2003) computed the PoA of a procurement game with option contracts. There are two main differences between option contracts and price-only contracts. First, option contracts are two-dimensional (there is the reservation price and the execution price); as a result, competition is multidimensional and preserves the diversity of suppliers. Second, there is no moral hazard with option contracts, as supply capacity is assumed to be contractible. Finally, Chan et al. (2006) characterized the loss of efficiency in a distribution system, where the manufacturer chooses the wholesale price and the retailer chooses the retail price under a buy-back contract.
In this paper, we quantify the impact of double marginalization in supply chains that use price-only contracts. All our bounds are tight and distribution free. In our analysis, we assume that the demand distribution has an increasing generalized failure rate (IGFR). This assumption is commonly introduced in the supply chain literature (e.g., see Porteus 2001, Cachon 2004 ) because it guarantees a unique solution to the game. Moreover, many probability distributions satisfy this property (e.g., normal, uniform, exponential, gamma, Weibull) . The IGFR characterization is nevertheless questionable as the set of IGFR distributions is not closed under convolution or shifting (Paul 2005) . Our results critically depend on this assumption as our bounds are typically attained "at the boundary" of the set of IGFR distributions. We also show that non-IGFR distributions can lead to a worse performance than what our bounds suggest (see Remark 1).
We focus on price-only contracts, as their inability to coordinate the supply chain lies at the foundation of the large body of research on more elaborate contracts (buyback, quantity flexibility, etc.). We assume that the only decisions are the wholesale price and the inventory/capacity levels at each stage. In particular, we assume that the retail price is fixed and that no efforts can be made to improve forecast accuracy, increase sales, or reduce costs. We also ignore the effect of repeated interaction (Anupindi and Bassok 1999) , nonzero reservation profits Porteus 2001, Bernstein and Marx 2005) , or renegotiation to a Pareto-improving situation (Ertogral and Wu 2001, Cachon 2004 ), as they diminish the impact of double marginalization.
We characterize the efficiency of different supply chain configurations: push or pull inventory positioning, two or more stages, serial or assembly systems, single or multiple competing suppliers, and single or multiple competing retailers. We also test the validity of our findings with a numerical study, measuring supply chain efficiency for commonly used demand distributions. Our analysis generates the following insights:
1. The loss of efficiency from double marginalization constitutes a major concern: Even in a two-stage supply chain, there might be a loss of efficiency of 42%; with more stages, the supply chain performance deteriorates further.
2. The efficiency of price-only contracts generally drops with the number of intermediaries but rallies when competition is introduced. There are however a few exceptions.
3. From a double-marginalization perspective, a pull inventory configuration generally outperforms a push configuration. That is, a make-to-order environment is generally more efficient than a make-tostock environment, even in the absence of lost sales costs and salvage costs. In particular, significant savings can be realized if the supply chain adopts an assemble-to-order production policy, i.e., assembles components after observing the demand.
The paper is organized as follows. In §2, we introduce the model framework and characterize the solution of the integrated supply chain. In §3, we compute the PoA of a serial system, first limited to two stages, then consisting of an arbitrary number of stages, in both pull and push configurations. Section 4 is devoted to deriving the PoA of assembly systems, in which the components are procured from different suppliers. In § §5 and 6, we quantify the efficiency of competition among suppliers and among retailers respectively. Finally, we summarize and discuss our results in §7 to provide insights into supply chain design. All proofs appear in the appendix.
Model Framework

Model Notations
Consider a supply chain facing the newsvendor problem. The supply chain has to build its inventory (or its capacity) Q before a selling season, without knowing the demand. We assume that costs are linear and denote by c the per-unit purchasing cost and by p the per-unit selling price. We suppose that the salvage value of the end products is zero. (A nonzero salvage value would attenuate the opportunity cost from not selling a unit, and it would then lower the PoA.) Therefore, the gross profit margin equals 1 − r, with r = c/p. Demand D is random and has a cumulative distribution function F x that is strictly increasing and continuous, with probability density function f x . We denote by F x the complementary distribution function, i.e., F x = 1 − F x .
In the sequel, we assume that the demand distribution has an IGFR (see Lariviere and Porteus 2001 , Lariviere 2006 , Paul 2005 . Let h x = f x / F x be the hazard rate and let g x = xh x be the generalized failure rate, approximating the percentage decrease in the probability of a stockout from increasing the stocking quantity by 1%. The IGFR assumption is sufficient to guarantee a well-behaved (unimodal) problem for the contract initiator in a decentralized setting.
We also define l x = h x x 0 F d / F x , roughly representing the percentage decrease in the probability of stockout from increasing the expected sales by 1%. The quantity l x is increasing if the distribution is IGFR (Cachon 2004 ).
Centralized Supply Chain
As a benchmark, we consider the centralized (or integrated) supply chain, as if there were a single decision maker operating the entire supply chain. The level of inventory is chosen to maximize the total supply chain expected profits:
The above problem-called the newsvendor problem-is concave and has the unique optimal solution Q c = F −1 r , where superscript c refers to the centralized (or integrated) supply chain. The optimal inventory level is such that the probability of stockout equals r = c/p.
The Price of Anarchy
The inventory level in a decentralized supply chain, denoted by Q d , is in general not equal to Q c , as each partner optimizes her own profit locally.
To measure the loss of efficiency, we derive a worstcase bound, computed over all IGFR distributions. We restrict our analysis to the class of IGFR distributions to ensure that the decentralized problem has a well-defined solution. This bound is a proxy for the magnitude of the loss of efficiency, without requiring to estimate the demand distribution. In fact, supply chain design, which is essentially strategic, must often be done without knowing the demand distribution (especially if the same supply chain is used for several generations of products), in contrast to inventory decisions, more tactical. All of our bounds are tight; that is, there exists an IGFR demand distribution for which the supply chain efficiency is characterized by the worst-case ratio. Definition 1. The PoA is the worst-case ratio of the profit of the centralized supply chain to the profit of the decentralized supply chain, that is,
where is the set of nonnegative demand distributions that have the IGFR property.
Decentralized Game Framework
In the following, we analyze the performance of the decentralized supply chain depicted in Figure 1 . The supply chain is divided into three parts: the procurement stage, the bill of materials of an assembly, and the distribution stage. A square represents a product and a circle represents a decision maker. A solid arrow symbolizes a "goes-into" relationship while a dashed arrow represents a supply/distribution channel.
In the center of the figure, the bill of materials represents an assembly structure, where N C components are assembled into one end product. At the procurement stage, in the left part of the figure, each component can be procured from any of N S competing suppliers. For simplicity, we assume the same number of suppliers corresponding to each component. Finally, at the distribution stage, the end-product can be sold to the end market through any of the N R retailers. Accordingly, the structure of the supply chain is parameterized by the triplet N C N S N R .
To highlight the impact of double marginalization of supplier interdependence through a bill of material, supplier competition, and retailer competition, we analyze several special cases of the general supply chain depicted in Figure 1 , corresponding to specific values of parameters N C , N S , and N R . In general, the structure of the game depends on whether the parameter values equal one or many (i.e., n, where n > 1). Table 1 , we consider two inventory configurations, according to the push-pull classification introduced by Cachon (2004) : When the downstream (respectively upstream) partner holds the supply chain inventory, the supply chain is said to be operated in a pull (respectively push) mode.
Consistently with the literature Porteus 2001, Cachon and , we model the problem as a Stackelberg game where a leader proposes a "take-it-or-leave-it" contract to a follower, and we assume perfect information. The timing of the game for a two-stage supply chain is outlined below. Note that the order of the last two steps of the game depends on the push-pull configuration of the supply chain.
1. The leader offers the follower a contract specifying the per-unit wholesale price w.
2. The follower accepts the contract if his expected profit is above his reservation profit, assumed to be zero. Otherwise, there is no transaction between the parties.
3 
Serial Supply Chain
We first characterize the efficiency of a two-stage supply chain, under a push or a pull configuration, constituted of a manufacturer and a retailer. We then extend our results to multistage serial structures.
Push Serial Supply Chain
In a push supply chain, the inventory is held at the retailer's site, i.e., the retailer makes to stock. We consider two Stackelberg games, depending on who proposes the contract.
3.1.1. Manufacturer Is the Leader. When the manufacturer chooses the wholesale price w to maximize her profits, she anticipates the retailer's order quantity. That is, she solves the following bilevel optimization problem:
Consistently with the standard principal-agent models, the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint states that the retailer chooses the order quantity to maximize his expected profit, and the individual rationality (IR) constraint ensures that the retailer earns at least his reservation profit (assumed to be zero). Lariviere and Porteus (2001) showed that if the demand distribution is IGFR with a finite mean, the manufacturer's problem is pseudo-concave. In particular, they showed that the manufacturer's optimal sales quantity lied in the interval A Q where A ≥ 0 is the lowest value of the support of the distribution, and Q = inf x g x ≤ 1 maximizes the manufacturer's revenues. They showed that Q is finite when the mean is finite.
However, requiring the mean to be finite is unnecessary. In fact, the manufacturer's profit is negative when w < c, or equivalently when Q > Q c ; on the other hand, the manufacturer can obtain zero profit by charging w = p, inducing the retailer not to order. Therefore, the manufacturer's optimal sales quantity lies in the interval A min Q Q c , which is always finite; moreover, over that interval, the manufacturer's profit function is strictly concave. Therefore, the optimal inventory level in the supply chain is either equal to the lowest value of the support of the demand distribution or uniquely determined by the following first-order optimality condition:
where g x = xf x / F x is the generalized failure rate. The next theorem quantifies the PoA (see (2)) of a two-stage push supply chain. Theorem 1. In a two-stage push supply chain, when the manufacturer is the initiator of the price-only contract,
The bound is tight. In particular, the worst-case demand distribution is a Pareto distribution, F x = S k x −k for x ≥ S, for some S > 0 and with k = 1 − r.
A Pareto distribution is asymmetric: demand is at least S units. Such a demand distribution is appropriate when orders of a total of S units have been precommitted, and all the remaining uncertainty lies on the excess demand above that level S. The bound is decreasing with r. When r → 1, PoA → e − 1, where e is the base of the natural logarithm.
Remark 1. The PoA measures the largest loss of efficiency over the set of IGFR distributions. With more general distributions, the loss of efficiency can be even larger. For instance, in the appendix, we consider a two-point demand distribution according to which demand equals A with probability 1 − r and equals B > A with probability r, and the PoA is 2 − A/B. When A/B → 0, this is greater than the bound derived in 1 when r > 0 5 Table 2 displays the performance of a two-stage push supply chain with a gamma demand distribution, i.e., f x = x k−1 exp −x/ / k k . Because supply chain efficiency is independent of the scale of the demand (Lariviere and Porteus 2001) , we only vary parameter k. As k increases, the coefficient of variation 1/ √ k decreases. In particular, we consider the following intervals for k: 0 05 0 5 , 0 5 5 , and 5 50 . Over each interval, we randomly choose a value for k and compute the ratio of profits, the ratio of inventory levels, and the stockout probability, for each value of r. Table 2 displays the 95% confidence intervals for the mean ratio of profits, mean inventory levels, and mean stockout probabilities over 100 simulated values.
As shown in Table 2 , the worst-case ratio PoA is roughly 30%-80% greater than the performance of the supply chain for a gamma demand distribution. The performance of the decentralized supply chain is decreasing with the profit margin 1 − r. As already noted by Lariviere and Porteus (2001) , efficiency may initially drop as the coefficient of variation 1/ √ k falls, but eventually improves, and the highest efficiency is attained at the lowest coefficient of variation. The lowest levels of efficiency are associated with a large difference in inventory levels between the decentralized and the integrated supply chain. Interestingly, for a given profit margin 1 − r, the cases with a large relative difference in inventory levels are also those with Table 2 Performance of a Two-Stage Push Supply Chain with a Gamma Demand Distribution The gamma, uniform, and Pareto probability distributions are unimodal. In contrast, the beta distribution, f x = 1/B x −1 1 − x −1 , is U-shaped when < 1 and < 1, but satisfies the IGFR property in that range of parameters. We consider the following three sets of intervals for : (1) ∈ 0 1 0 3 and ∈ 0 7 0 9 , (2) ∈ 0 4 0 6 and ∈ 0 4 0 6 , (3) ∈ 0 7 0 9 and ∈ 0 1 0 3 . As increases and decreases, the coefficient of variation decreases. Similarly, the following mixture of power distributions,
k + 1/2x 1/k , is U-shaped and satisfies the IGFR property. Bimodal distributions are typically considered to model the demand of a new product, with comparable probabilities of being a dog or a star. For each case, we randomly choose a value for the parameters, and compute the ratio of profits. Table 3 displays the 95% confidence intervals for the mean performance measures, over 100 simulation runs. Unlike the two-point distribution in Remark 1, the beta distribution and the mixture of power distributions give rise to moderate levels of inefficiency, possibly because their support is bounded. Supply chain performance deteriorates when the coefficient of variation gets larger, but increases with the profit margin 1 − r, in contrast to the gamma demand distribution. In fact, we have observed in our numerical study that large relative differences in inventory levels between the decentralized and the integrated supply chains occurred with large coefficients of variation, but also with small profit margins. The impact of the profit margin on the inventory levels and on supply chain performance with a beta demand distribution is thus opposite from that with a gamma demand distribution.
To conclude, our numerical study shows that supply chain inefficiency is typically lower than the worst-case bound, but is nevertheless significant, typically around 30%. Inefficiency generally increases with the coefficient of variation of the demand distribution, although this effect may not be monotone. On Table 3 Performance of a Two-Stage Push Supply Chain with Bimodal Demand Distributions Beta Mixture power r PoA ∈ 0 1 0 3 ∈ 0 7 0 9 ∈ 0 4 0 6 ∈ 0 4 0 6 ∈ 0 7 0 9 ∈ 0 1 0 3 k∈ 0 1 0 2 2.48 1 35 ± 0 00 1 30 ± 0 00 1 16 ± 0 01 1 27 ± 0 01 0 4 2.10 1 36 ± 0 01 1 32 ± 0 00 1 21 ± 0 01 1 27 ± 0 01 0 6
1.92 1 36 ± 0 01 1 34 ± 0 00 1 26 ± 0 01 1 33 ± 0 00 0 8
1.80 1 36 ± 0 01 1 35 ± 0 01 1 31 ± 0 00 1 34 ± 0 00 the other hand, inefficiency can increase or decrease with the profit margin, depending on the demand distribution.
3.1.2. Retailer Is the Leader. If the retailer proposes the contract, there is no moral hazard and the first-best solution is achieved. Formally, the retailer solves the following bilevel optimization problem:
It is easy to see that the retailer proposes a price w = c. As a result, the retailer's problem reduces to (1). Therefore, full coordination is achieved, i.e., PoA = 1.
3.1.3. Multistage Supply Chain. Let us consider a multistage serial supply chain, where every stage offers a take-it-or-leave-it contract to the next downstream stage. As double marginalization occurs at every stage, the performance of the decentralized supply chain deteriorates. To highlight the effect of double marginalization, we assume that the intermediaries in the supply chain incur no additional cost, and by consequence, do not add value to the product. We start with characterizing a bound on the level of inventory in the decentralized supply chain Q d .
Lemma 1. With an IGFR demand distribution, the optimal inventory level in an
Using Lemma 1, the next theorem quantifies the worst-case loss of efficiency.
Theorem 2. In an n-stage serial push supply chain, when every stage offers a contract to the next downstream stage,
The approximation, obtained from a series expansion around r = 1, shows that the number of intermediaries has an exponential influence on the value of the PoA. Figure 2 depicts the evolution of PoA of a serial push supply chain as the profit margin 1 − r increases and as the number of intermediaries n increases. Table 4 compares the PoA with the profit ratio Q c / Q d of serial supply chains with three and four echelons, under a gamma demand distribution. As in Table 2 , we considered three intervals for k and report the 95% confidence intervals of the mean profit ratio over 100 simulated values.
As in a two-stage supply chain, efficiency generally increases when the coefficient of variation decreases (although it might initially decrease), and the supply chain is the most efficient when the coefficient of variation is the lowest.
When the demand distribution is uniform between 0 and B, one can show that the profit ratio equals 16/7 = 2 29 when there are three echelons, and 64/15 = 4 27 when there are four echelons, independently of B and the profit margin. Figure 2 and Table 4 illustrate that the level of inefficiency increases with the number of intermediaries in the supply chain, reflecting the impact of double marginalization. More specifically, the PoA is nearly doubled each time a new intermediary is added.
Pull Serial Supply Chain
In a pull supply chain, the inventory is held at the manufacturer's site, i.e., the retailer makes to order. Table 4 Performance of an n-Stage Push Supply Chain
r PoA k ∈ 0 05 0 5 k∈ 0 5 5 k∈ 5 50 PoA k ∈ 0 05 0 5 k∈ 0 5 5 k∈ 5 50 0 2 4.14 2 53 ± 0 01 2 45 ± 0 02 1 70 ± 0 04 7.68 5 12 ± 0 05 4 39 ± 0 12 2 08 ± 0 10 0 4 3.72 2 47 ± 0 02 2 31 ± 0 02 1 63 ± 0 03 7.15 4 92 ± 0 04 4 01 ± 0 10 1 98 ± 0 09 0 6 3.50 2 44 ± 0 01 2 21 ± 0 02 1 58 ± 0 03 6.81 4 84 ± 0 04 3 76 ± 0 11 1 90 ± 0 09 0 8 3.32 2 44 ± 0 01 2 13 ± 0 02 1 54 ± 0 03 6.56 4 78 ± 0 05 3 59 ± 0 10 1 80 ± 0 07
We consider two Stackelberg games, depending on who proposes the contract.
3.2.1. Retailer Is the Leader. The retailer proposes the manufacturer a wholesale price so as to maximize her expected profits, anticipating the manufacturer's choice of inventory level. Formally, the retailer solves the following bilevel optimization problem:
Cachon and Lariviere (2001) showed that the optimal inventory level Q d is either equal to the lowest value of support of the demand distribution or uniquely determined by the following first-order optimality conditions:
where
The next theorem characterizes the loss of efficiency from decentralizing operations.
Theorem 3. In a two-stage pull supply chain, when the retailer is the initiator of the price-only contract,
where e approximately equals 2 718282 and is the base of the natural logarithm.
Equivalently, the loss of efficiency (computed by 1 − 1/PoA) is 42%. The bound is tight and is attained with the following piecewise Pareto demand distribution, with a breakpoint at Q d , Table 5 Performance of a Two-Stage Pull Supply Chain with a Gamma Demand Distribution where
and both l and k tend to zero, but l tends faster to zero than k. Roughly speaking, the demand is either equal to zero with probability 1 − r, or greater than Q c with probability r. Thus, in the worst case, the product is either a success (sales are greater than Q c ) or a failure. Given the one-shot nature of the game, such a demand distribution would be appropriate for the launch of a new product.
The PoA in a pull supply chain is lower than that of a push supply chain (Theorem 1) when r < 1, and equal when r = 1. In fact, in a pull supply chain, the demand risk is spread over the two parties because the transfer of inventory occurs after the demand realization. In contrast, in a push supply chain, only the retailer is directly exposed to the demand risk, as he orders before observing demand. Because there is more risk sharing in a pull supply chain, the individual objectives are more aligned, and the whole supply chain is more efficient. Table 5 compares the PoA with the performance of a two-stage pull supply chain, with a gamma distribution and different ranges of values for the shape parameter k. Table 5 summarizes the mean ratio of profits, the mean ratio of inventory levels, and the mean stockout probability, over 100 simulations. The PoA is in general 30% higher than the profit ratio attained with a gamma demand distribution. Comparing Table 5 with Table 2 corroborates the result that a pull supply chain is more efficient than a push supply chain. In fact, a pull supply chain is characterized with higher inventory levels and lower stockout probabilities than a push supply chain. The performance of a pull supply chain deteriorates when the coefficient of variation increases, but rallies when the profit margin 1 − r increases, unlike the performance of a push configuration. In fact, environments with Table 6 Performance of a Two-Stage Pull Supply Chain with Bimodal Demand Distributions Beta Mixture power r PoA ∈ 0 1 0 3 ∈ 0 7 0 9 ∈ 0 4 0 6 ∈ 0 4 0 6 ∈ 0 7 0 9 ∈ 0 1 0 3 k∈ 0 1 0 2 1.72 1 27 ± 0 00 1 16 ± 0 00 1 06 ± 0 00 1 14 ± 0 00 0 4 1.72 1 32 ± 0 01 1 25 ± 0 00 1 14 ± 0 01 1 20 ± 0 01 0 6 1.72 1 34 ± 0 01 1 30 ± 0 00 1 21 ± 0 01 1 30 ± 0 01 0 8 1.72 1 36 ± 0 01 1 33 ± 0 01 1 29 ± 0 00 1 33 ± 0 00 a high degree of inefficiency are associated with a large relative difference in inventory levels between the decentralized and the integrated supply chain but also, somewhat surprisingly, with a relatively good service level. When the demand is uniform between 0 and B, one can show that the ratio takes on values between 1 (when r → 0) and 4/3 (when r → 1), independently of B. Therefore, supply chain performance increases with the profit margin, as with a gamma demand distribution.
Finally, Table 6 measures the profit ratios with a beta demand distribution, for various ranges of values of the shape parameters , and with a mixture of power distributions, F x = 1/2x k + 1/2x 1/k , for various values of k. Both distributions are bimodal, similarly to the piecewise Pareto distribution characterizing the worst-case bound in Theorem 3. However, the performance of the decentralized supply chain with those demand distribution is significantly lower than the bound e − 1. Comparing Table 6 with Table 3 illustrates the superior performance of a pull system. Table 3 also reveals that supply chain performance deteriorates when the coefficient of variation of the demand becomes large or when the profit margins are eroded.
To conclude, our numerical study shows that the PoA is in general 30% higher than the profit ratio attained with a gamma, a uniform, or a beta demand distribution. A pull configuration always significantly outperforms a push configuration. Supply chain efficiency generally decreases with the coefficient of variation of the demand, but improves when the profit margin grows.
Manufacturer Is the Leader.
If the manufacturer proposes the contract, there is no moral hazard. Formally, the manufacturer solves the following bilevel optimization problem:
It is easy to see that the manufacturer will propose a wholesale price w = p. As a result, the manufacturer's problem is equivalent to (1) and the PoA is equal to 1.
3.2.3. Multistage Supply Chain. Let us consider a multistage serial pull supply chain, where every stage offers a take-it-or-leave-it contract to the next upstream stage. As double marginalization occurs at every stage, the performance of the decentralized supply chain deteriorates as the number of intermediaries increases. We start with characterizing the level of inventory in the decentralized supply chain, Q d .
Lemma 2. With an IGFR demand distribution, the optimal inventory level in an
Using Lemma 2, the next theorem quantifies the worst-case loss of efficiency. n − 1 With two stages, the PoA is equal to 1.72; with three stages, it goes up to 3.19; with four stages, it raises to 6.36.
As in the two-stage supply chain, the performance of the pull supply chain dominates that of the push supply chain. In particular, the PoA of the pull supply chain corresponds to the PoA of the push supply chain with zero margin, i.e., r = 1 (compare Theorem 4 with the approximation of the PoA in a push supply chain in Theorem 2). Table 7 compares the performance of the decentralized supply chain, with three or four stages, when the demand distribution is gamma. As in a two-stage supply chain (see Table 5 ), the performance of the supply chain decreases with the coefficient of variation 1/ √ k and increases with the profit margin 1 − r. Moreover, comparing Tables 4 and 7 reveals that a pull serial system is more efficient than a push serial system, consistently with the worst-case analysis.
Assembly System
In this section, we characterize the efficiency of a twolevel assembly system, depicted in Figure 3 . We consider a manufacturer who purchases for assembly n distinct components from outside suppliers. Following the framework proposed in Figure 1 , we assume Table 7 Performance of an n-Stage Pull Supply Chain 
that there are N C = n components to be assembled and that each of these is procured from exactly N S = 1 supplier. Note that, in contrast to §3, the manufacturer is located downstream of the supply chain; accordingly, N R = 1. Each supplier is specialized in the production of a particular component; therefore, suppliers are not competing on the same markets. However, they have strategic interactions as they are linked through the assembly process. Let c i be the unit production cost of supplier i, i = 1 n, and c 0 be the unit assembly cost of the manufacturer; as before, p is the unit selling price of the end product.
Because all components are needed for the production of the end product, the system capacity corresponds to the minimum level of capacity (or inventory) held by each supplier. As a result, if one supplier is particularly reluctant to build large inventories, it will affect the performance of the entire system.
Push Assembly System
We consider first a push supply chain, i.e., where the manufacturer orders before observing the demand. As in a two-stage supply chain, if the manufacturer specifies the terms of the contracts, full efficiency is achieved. On the other hand, if the suppliers specify the contracts, the decentralized supply chain is less efficient than the centralized supply chain. In particular, suppose that each supplier i proposes the manufacturer a unit transfer price w i in order to maximize Figure 3 Assembly Structure Suppliers Manufacturer her profit. As the manufacturer makes to stock, he faces the standard newsvendor problem. Anticipating the manufacturer's order size, the suppliers propose transfer prices to jointly solve the following bilevel optimization problem: Gerchak and Wang (2004) proved the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the game and showed that the quantity ordered by the manufacturer at each of his suppliers is either equal to the lowest value of the support of the demand distribution or determined by the following equation:
Because the left-hand side is constant for every supplier, it turns out that, at the Nash equilibrium, all suppliers make the same profit, i.e., w i − c i = w j − c j , ∀ i j. Therefore, one can show that w i = c i + 1/n p F Q d − n j=0 c i , and that the first-order optimality condition reduces to
where r = n i=0 c i /p. The next theorem quantifies the loss of efficiency in the assembly system. Theorem 5. In a push assembly system with n components, when the suppliers offer the price-only contracts,
As shown in Figure 4 , the loss of efficiency of price-only contracts can be dramatic in push assembly systems. The performance of the decentralized supply chain quickly falls as the number of components and the profit margins increase. Comparing Figures 2 and 4 reveals that the PoA is larger in push assembly systems with n components than in n-stage push serial structures. Therefore, aiming at reducing the number of stages in the assembly process (e.g., through the production of kits upstream of the assembly stage) can be valuable to mitigate the effect of double marginalization, everything else being equal. However, the performance of an assembly system is not always so poor. Table 8 compares the profit ratios Q c / Q d of an assembly structure with two or three components, when the demand has a gamma distribution. Similarly, when the demand distribution is uniform between 0 and B, one can show that the profit ratio equals n + 1 2 / 2n + 1 , independently of the profit margin and the upper bound B; in particular, the profit ratio equals 9/5 = 1 8 and 16/7 = 2 29 when there are two and three components to assemble, respectively. Unlike the Pareto distribution, which characterizes the worst-case bound, the gamma and uniform distributions are associated with efficiency losses that are comparable to (and in fact even lower than) those in serial structures (see Table 4 ). For these distributions, only the number of intermediaries in the supply chain seems to affect its performance, almost independently of the network configuration.
Pull Assembly System
Let us consider now a pull assembly system, i.e., where the manufacturer assembles to order but the suppliers decide their inventory level without knowing the exact demand (e.g., because of long lead Table 8 Performance of an n-Component Push Assembly System n = 2 n = 3 times). Suppose that the manufacturer has full negotiating power and offers each of her suppliers a price-only contract. Given he is offered a wholesale price w i , supplier i will hold a certain level of inventory Q i . Consequently, the manufacturer will be able to assemble at most Q = min i=1 n Q i products. Anticipating the reaction of her suppliers, the manufacturer designs the contracts in order to maximize her profits, that is max
The IC constraint represents the newsvendor problem faced by each supplier, selling the minimum between the demand D, his capacity level Q i , and the other suppliers' capacity levels, denoted by Q −i . As all components are required to assemble one unit of end product, the system capacity is the minimum of the inventory levels of all suppliers. Wang and Gerchak (2003) proved the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium in the subgame. They also showed that the optimal level of capacity is either equal to the lowest boundary of the support of the distribution or uniquely determined by the following first-order optimality condition:
The quantity defined by (6) is the same as the quantity determined by (4), as if the supply chain had only one supplier. As a result, the PoA is unaffected by the number of suppliers in a pull assembly system.
Corollary 1. In a pull assembly system, when the manufacturer offers the price-only contracts,
Therefore, the performance of a pull assembly system is equal to that of a two-stage pull supply chain. Similarly, an n-layer pull assembly system is equivalent to an n-stage pull serial system (see Bernstein and DeCroix 2004) . Although the performance of a push assembly system dramatically falls as the number of components increases (see Figure 4) , the PoA of a pull assembly system remains equal to 1.72, independently of the profit margin and of the number of components. Therefore, when the profit margins are large and the bill of materials is complex, it is highly profitable, from a pure double-marginalization perspective, to operate the assembly stage in a pull instead of a push mode. Part of computer company Dell's success can be explained by its assemble-to-order production policy (Dell and Magretta 1998) ; in addition to lowering system inventories and making the supply chain more responsive to demand variations, this configuration also mitigates the efficiency losses due to double marginalization.
Competitive Procurement System
In this section, we quantify the impact of competition among suppliers on supply chain efficiency. In general, competition improves system efficiency, but the degree of improvement depends on the supply chain structure and the level of competition.
We consider a competitive procurement system similar to the one displayed in Figure 5 . Following the framework introduced in Figure 1 , we assume that the manufacturer needs only N C = 1 component, purchased from any of N S suppliers, to make a unit of final product. All suppliers are identical, i.e., procure the same component and have the same unit cost c. As before, the manufacturer is downstream of the supply chain and sells the final product at a unit price p; accordingly, N R = 1.
Push Procurement System
In a push supply chain, the manufacturer bears all risk of the supply chain (i.e., he is a newsvendor). Let us assume that the suppliers choose the wholesale prices. Facing different wholesale prices w i 's for the same homogeneous component, the manufacturer orders from the cheapest supplier. Because the suppliers bear no risk, the cheapest supplier will not ration her capacity and will deliver the exact amount ordered. If several suppliers offer the same low price, we assume that the manufacturer splits his order equally among them. This game is exactly a Bertrand competition (Bertrand 1883). Accordingly, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in which all suppliers offer the same wholesale price c. As a result, there is no loss of efficiency in this supply chain, i.e., PoA = 1. Interestingly, the push configuration leads to the poorest performance in serial supply chains, but full efficiency is achieved as soon as competition is introduced.
Similarly, when the manufacturer is the leader, she offers a wholesale price c to each of her suppliers, and the supply chain operates at full efficiency.
Pull Procurement System
In a pull supply chain, the suppliers bear the demand risk. The manufacturer is in general not able to procure everything she needs from the same supplier, as this supplier might hold limited inventory. In fact, the cheapest supplier has the least incentives to hold large inventories, as his margins are the thinnest. By increasing the number of suppliers, the manufacturer has more sourcing options and risks less to be held up by one of her suppliers.
Let us assume that the manufacturer initiates the contracts with her suppliers. Anticipating their limited incentives for holding large inventories, the manufacturer offers different wholesale prices to her suppliers. After demand is realized, the manufacturer will procure what she needs from her suppliers in increasing order of wholesale prices. Suppose without loss of generality that supplier i is proposed the ith smallest wholesale price and let us denote by C i the cumulative inventory from supplier 1 to supplier i, i.e., C i = j≤i Q i . Therefore, the manufacturer will order from supplier i only if demand D exceeds the cumulative inventory level of suppliers 1 to i − 1, i.e., if D ≥ C i−1 . Thus, the manufacturer offers different wholesale prices w i to maximize her profits, that is max
with C 0 = 0. The IR constraints are always satisfied if C i ≥ C i−1 for all i. The IC constraints represent the newsvendor problem faced by each supplier, conditional on the fact that demand exceeds C i−1 for supplier i to receive an order. The optimal solution to IC is such that the cumulative inventory for suppliers 1 i equals C i = F −1 c/w i . Because there is a one-to-one correspondence between wholesale prices w i and cumulative inventory levels C i , the manufacturer can equivalently choose the induced inventory levels C i . Plugging w i = c/ F C i into the objective function and integrating by parts simplifies the manufacturer's problem to
where C 0 = 0. The optimal cumulative inventory levels in the competitive procurement system can then be determined from the following set of first-order optimality conditions:
F x dx
As we show in Lemma 6 in the appendix, the firstorder conditions are also sufficient for IGFR demand distributions with increasing f x F x / f x 2 ; for these distributions, the objective function is concave. In particular, the exponential, the Pareto, and the uniform satisfy this condition, so as the Weibull when the shape parameter is less than one. On the other hand, the normal distribution does not satisfy this condition, and there are some instances where the objective is not concave (e.g., when the demand distribution is Table 9 Performance of an n-Supplier Competitive Procurement System n = 2 n = 3 r PoA k ∈ 0 05 0 5 k∈ 0 5 5 k∈ 5 50 PoA k ∈ 0 05 0 5 k∈ 0 5 5 k∈ 5 50 0 2 1.39 1 11 ± 0 00 1 06 ± 0 00 1 03 ± 0 00 1.28 1 06 ± 0 00 1 03 ± 0 00 1 02 ± 0 00 0 4 1.39 1 12 ± 0 00 1 08 ± 0 00 1 04 ± 0 00 1.28 1 07 ± 0 00 1 04 ± 0 00 1 02 ± 0 00 0 6 1.39 1 14 ± 0 00 1 09 ± 0 00 1 05 ± 0 00 1.28 1 08 ± 0 01 1 05 ± 0 00 1 02 ± 0 00 0 8
1.39 1 15 ± 0 00 1 10 ± 0 00 1 05 ± 0 00 1.28 1 10 ± 0 01 1 05 ± 0 00 1 02 ± 0 00 N 10 2 , with n = 2, p = 2, c = 1, the profit function is only pseudoconcave). The next theorem quantifies the loss of efficiency in a procurement system. Adding competition improves the performance of the decentralized supply chain. However, full efficiency is only achieved in the limit, when the number of competing suppliers becomes large.
Theorem 6. In a pull procurement system, when the manufacturer offers price-only contracts to n competitive suppliers, then With one supplier, the PoA equals 1.72; with two suppliers, the PoA goes down to 1.39; with three suppliers, it lowers to 1 28. In the limit, with an infinite number of competing suppliers, the decentralized supply chain is as efficient as the integrated supply chain. Table 9 depicts the performance of competitive procurement systems with two or three suppliers, when the demand distribution is gamma. Comparing Table 9 with Table 5 illustrates how competition gradually improves supply chain efficiency, consistently with the worst-case analysis.
On the other hand, when the suppliers are the leaders and offer the manufacturer wholesale-price contracts, there exists no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (see Bryant 1980 for an analogous game). The manufacturer always orders in priority from the cheapest supplier; if two suppliers offer the same price, we assume that the manufacturer orders an equal amount from each of them. Consider two competitors i and j with prices w i < w j . By offering a price w j − and holding the same level of inventory as supplier j, supplier i will make more profit than supplier j with positive probability, because the manufacturer always gives priority to the cheapest supplier. If supplier i offers w j − , supplier j can increase its profits by lowering its price to w j − 2 and holding the same level of inventory as supplier i, contradicting that w i < w j . Similarly, if w i = w j > c, supplier i can decrease her price to w j − and make more profit. If w i = w j = c, supplier i can increase her price and make positive profit.
However, there exists a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in that game if the demand distribution is continuous with a finite mean (Dasgupta and Maskin 1986) . For each supplier, the feasible set of wholesale prices is the closed interval c p . The payoff of supplier i is continuous, except on the set of points for which w i = w j for some j = i. It is bounded because the demand has a finite mean. At the points of discontinuity w i = w j > c, supplier i can increase its profit by lowering its price; hence, its payoff is everywhere lower semicontinuous. Finally, the sum of profits of all suppliers is continuous because discontinuous changes of orders from one supplier to the other occurs only when both suppliers earn the same profit.
Competitive Distribution System
In this section, we quantify the impact of competition among retailers on supply chain efficiency. In particular, we consider a distribution system, in which N R = n > 1 identical retailers compete for the same demand, each with a unit selling price p, as shown in Figure 6 . In order to compare the performance of the competitive system with an integrated supply chain (1), we assume that the aggregate demand has a distribution function F and is allocated to the retailers according to some rule, as in Lippman and McCardle (1997) . All retailers are served by the same manufacturer, producing the same product at a unit cost c; accordingly, N S = N C = 1. Note that, in contrast to § §4 and 5, the manufacturer is located upstream in the supply chain. 
Push Distribution System
We first analyze the case where the inventory is located downstream, i.e., at the retailers' sites, assuming that the manufacturer proposes the contracts. We consider two different allocation rules: herd behavior and splitting proportional to inventories.
6.1.1. Herd Behavior. Suppose that customers move as a herd and visit one retailer at a time, in a certain order, until the total demand is satisfied. The order between retailers = 1 n is chosen randomly, and all permutations are equally likely (see Lippman and McCardle 1997) .
The manufacturer proposes a set of prices w 1 w n to maximize her expected profits, given that the retailers face the demand risk associated with the customers' herd behavior. Formally, it solves the following problem:
where the retailers choose their order quantity to maximize their expected profits, taken over all possible permutations. The retailers are symmetric because all permutations are equally likely. Therefore, if they are offered the same wholesale prices, they will order the same quantity. Given the symmetry, the manufacturer offers the same price to all retailers as they all equally contribute to her profits. Let Q be the order quantity of each retailer. The retailer's problem then simplifies to maximize p n k=1 1/n E min x D − kQ + − wx, and the optimal order quantity is uniquely determined by 1/n n k=1 F kQ = w/p (Lippman and McCardle 1997) . Replacing the wholesale price with the induced order quantity in the manufacturer's profit function, it turns out that the optimal order quantity of each retailer is either equal to the lowest value of the support of the demand distribution or uniquely determined by
The next theorem characterizes the loss of efficiency in this competitive distribution system. Theorem 7. In a push distribution system with n retailers and herd behavior, when the manufacturer offers the price-only contracts, then
The approximation, obtained from expanding the Taylor series of PoA around r = 1, shows the magnitude of improvement when the number of retailers increases. Figure 7 depicts how supply chain efficiency increases with the number of retailers. 6.1.2. Splitting Proportional to Inventories. Suppose now that the aggregate demand is allocated to the retailers proportionally to their inventory levels (Cachon 2003) . There is no reallocation of the unmet demand. Specifically, if retailer i holds Q i units and there are Q units in the system, i.e., Q = j Q j , the fraction of demand observed by retailer i is Q i /Q. Consequently, the manufacturer solves the following optimization problem:
For a given wholesale price w, Cachon (2003) showed the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium of the subgame. He also showed that the optimal order level Q d is determined by the following first-order optimality condition:
The next theorem quantifies the loss of efficiency of such a distribution system. Theorem 8. In a push distribution system with n retailers, when the manufacturer offers the price-only contracts and when the aggregate demand is allocated proportionally to the inventory levels, then
The PoA is the same as if customers adopt a herd behavior (see Theorem 7), although the optimality conditions (7) and (8) are different. Therefore, this bound is robust in the sense that it does not seem to depend on the allocation/reallocation mechanism (as long as there is competition among retailers). Table 10 compares the PoA to the performance of distribution systems with splitting proportional to inventory levels when demand has a gamma distribution. Consistently with the worst-case analysis, introducing additional competing retailers improves the channel efficiency. As for the supply chain with a single retailer (Table 2) , supply chain performance first decreases as the coefficient of variation falls, but eventually increases. The threshold value for k, after which supply chain efficiency starts to increase, is however greater than if there were only one retailer.
Pull Distribution System
In a pull supply chain, the manufacturer bears all demand risk. We consider two allocation schemes: herd behavior and uniform split. (The allocation rule based on the relative inventory position is irrelevant here because retailers order after observing the demand.) 6.2.1. Herd Behavior. Suppose that all customers visit the same retailer. Because the retailer can order anything she wants from the manufacturer, within the limits of the manufacturer's inventory, she will sell the minimum between the demand and the manufacturer's inventory. In contrast to a push distribution system with herd behavior, customers will not visit more than one retailer. Suppose in addition that each retailer has an equal chance of facing the total demand. Then, retailers choose the wholesale prices they offer to the manufacturer, anticipating the manufacturer's inventory decision, by solving the Table 10 Performance of an n-Retailer Competitive Distribution System With Splitting Proportional to Inventories n = 2 n = 3 r PoA k ∈ 0 05 0 5 k∈ 0 5 5 k∈ 5 50 PoA k ∈ 0 05 0 5 k∈ 0 5 5 k∈ 5 50 0 2 1.51 1 11 ± 0 00 1 15 ± 0 00 1 16 ± 0 00 1.30 1 05 ± 0 00 1 07 ± 0 00 1 11 ± 0 00 0 4 1.42 1 11 ± 0 00 1 14 ± 0 00 1 14 ± 0 00 1.25 1 05 ± 0 00 1 07 ± 0 00 1 10 ± 0 00 0 6 1.36 1 11 ± 0 00 1 14 ± 0 00 1 13 ± 0 00 1.22 1 05 ± 0 00 1 07 ± 0 00 1 09 ± 0 00 0 8 1.32 1 11 ± 0 00 1 13 ± 0 00 1 12 ± 0 00 1.20 1 05 ± 0 01 1 08 ± 0 00 1 08 ± 0 00 following problem:
Therefore, the manufacturer faces a newsvendor problem, with a selling price equal to the average of the proposed wholesale prices. Accordingly, he chooses an inventory level such that the stockout probability F Q equals cn/ i w i . Given the wholesale prices of the other retailers, each retailer i chooses a wholesale price w i , or equivalently, the induced order quantity Q such that F Q 1 + j =i w j /p = rn 1 + l Q . If the demand distribution is IGFR, each retailer's profit function is concave. Moreover, the set of possible wholesale prices, c p is compact and convex. As a result, there exists a pure-strategy symmetric Nash equilibrium. Because the right-hand side is the same for all retailers, it turns out that all retailers choose the same wholesale price. Replacing each w j with c/ F Q in the optimality condition simplifies to
The next theorem characterizes the efficiency of this pull distribution system. Theorem 9. In a pull distribution system with n retailers with herd behavior, when the retailers propose the priceonly contracts, then
With one retailer, PoA = 1 72 as in Theorem 3. In contrast to the other competitive systems analyzed so far (competitive procurement, push distribution), competition increases inefficiency in this system. With two retailers, PoA = 3 19; with three retailers, PoA = 6 36. In fact, because the manufacturer bases his inventory decision on the average wholesale price, retailers have less incentives to discount their wholesale prices, as their impact on the inventory decision is diluted.
6.2.2. Uniform Allocation. Suppose now that the aggregate demand is split uniformly among retailers. That is, if the aggregate demand is D, each retailer observes a demand D/n. Let us assume that the retailers are the leaders and propose the wholesale prices to the manufacturer. After observing the demand, the retailers place their orders to the manufacturer. If the wholesale prices are different, the manufacturer serves the retailers in decreasing order of wholesale prices. In case of equal wholesale prices, the manufacturer allocates an equal amount to each retailer.
If there are no potential entrants, there exists no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. For instance, consider two competitors i and j with prices w j < w i . By offering a price w j + and ordering the same amount as retailer j, retailer i will make more profit than retailer j with positive probability, because the manufacturer always gives priority to the retailer with the highest price. If retailer i offers w j + , retailer j will increase its price to w j + 2 , contradicting that w j < w i . Similarly, if w i = w j < p, retailer i can increase her price to w j + and make more profit. If w i = w j = p, retailer i can decrease her price and make positive profit. Therefore, there exists no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. However, there exists a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium (see Dasgupta and Maskin 1986) .
If there is at least one potential entrant, there exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, at which all retailers earn zero profit by setting w = p, and the system operates under full efficiency.
Conclusions
In this paper, we quantify the loss of efficiency from decentralizing operations in a supply chain that uses price-only contracts. In particular, we measure the PoA, defined as the ratio of total profits of the centralized (or integrated) supply chain to those of the decentralized supply chain. Our bounds are IGFR distribution free and depend on the profit margin 1 − r. Table 11 summarizes the different PoAs bounds associated with the following supply chain configurations: push or pull inventory positioning, two or more stages, serial or assembly systems, single or multiple competing suppliers, and single or multiple competing retailers. For the sake of clarity, Table 11 Table 11 Price of Anarchy in Decentralized Supply Chains with PriceOnly Contracts focuses on the cases where the downstream (respectively upstream) partner is the contract initiator when the inventory configuration is in a push (respectively pull) mode. By comparing the values of the PoA under different supply chain network configuration, we make the following observations:
1. In simple configurations (e.g., two-stage supply chains), the PoA is at least 1.71. Thus, the inefficiency of price-only contracts has not been overstated in the literature. This magnitude of the loss of efficiency justifies the whole stream of research on the design of more elaborate contracts and motivates future research on improving coordination in supply chains.
2. The efficiency of price-only contracts generally drops as the number of intermediaries increases (in series or assembly). However, this might not always be the case: In a pull assembly system, the PoA is independent of the number of suppliers.
3. Introducing competition generally increases supply chain efficiency. The impact of competition on supply chain coordination is sometimes radical (push procurement), sometimes more gradual (pull procurement, push distribution). However, competition is not always beneficial and can sometimes lead to an increase in inefficiency (pull distribution).
4. In general, a pull configuration mitigates the effects of double marginalization more than a push configuration, as the inventory risk is shared among the supply chain partners. This is especially true in an assembly system, in which the loss of efficiency might be extreme; therefore, in complex assembly systems with small profit margins, huge benefits can be reaped by moving the inventory from a push to a pull configuration. With competition however, a pull system might outperform a push system. Table 11 summarizes the results obtained for the "classical" Stackelberg games, where the leader is the upstream party in the push game and the downstream party in the pull game. However, if we reverse the roles between the upstream and the downstream parties, full coordination is in general achieved, i.e., PoA = 1. Future research needs to address the impact of the reservation profit (assumed to be zero in this paper) and to analyze the possible improvements through long-term relationship or renegotiation. Also, it would be interesting to quantify one party's share of profit in the worst case, as well as formalizing the impact of the coefficient of variation on supply chain efficiency. of the Operations Management Seminar at the Sloan School of Management for their insightful comments, which have significantly improved this paper. Preparation of this paper was supported, in part, by the Presidential Early Career Award for Scientists and Engineers (PECASE) Award DMI-9984339 from the National Science Foundation and the Singapore-Massachusetts Institute of Technology Alliance Program.
Appendix. Proofs of Lemmas and Theorems
Lemma 3. Fix F Q = . Then, inf F ∈ Q 0 F x = Q ,
where is the set of all IGFR distributions; the minimizing distribution is the following:
when l tends to zero.
Proof. With the proposed distribution,
and it is equal to Q when l tends to zero. The distribution has a constant generalized failure rate, equal to l, between Q 1/l and Q, and is thus IGFR.
where is the set of all IGFR distributions.
Proof. Expressing F x as an exponential function of its hazard rate (Barlow and Proschan 1965) ,
where is the set of IGFR distributions. The maximizing distribution is piecewise Pareto with a breakpoint at Q d :
Proof. From integrating by parts, E min
After dividing both the numerator and the denominator by p, the ratio of profits can be written as follows:
F x dx
Because the ratio is greater than 1, it is maximized when
F x dx with its lower bound gives rise to the following bound:
The ratio is maximized when Q c Q d F x dx is the largest. Using Lemma 4 gives rise to the following inequality:
After replacing
by its upper bound, and dividing both sides of the ratio by Q d , one obtains the following bound:
The ratio is increasing with 
The right-hand side is an increasing function of k and attains its maximum when k = 1 − r (because r/ 1 − k = F Q d ≤ 1), leading to the theorem statement. Note that, because F Q d = 1 in the worst-case, Q d is not in the interior but corresponds to the lowest value of the support of the distribution.
On Remark 1. If ≥ r, the optimal inventory level in the integrated supply chain, Q c , equals B. In the decentralized supply chain, the manufacturer can induce the retailer to order A or B. If she induces the retailer to order A, she will offer a wholesale price p and obtain a profit equal to p − c A. On the other hand, if she induces the retailer to order B, the maximum wholesale price she can offer is p, which would leave her with a profit equal to p − c B. If ≤ r + 1 − r A/B, she will choose a price p and induce an order quantity A. The ratio of expected profits for the entire supply chain is then equal to
The ratio increases with and is maximized when = r + 1 − r A/B. At its maximum, the ratio equals 2 − A/B.
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof is by induction, by moving upstream along the supply chain. With only two stages, the lemma reduces to (3).
For the induction, assume that if the supply chain consists of i stages and has an inbound cost w, the order quantity satisfies F Q 1 − g Q i−1 ≥ w/p. Consider now the stage upstream of that supply chain, i.e., stage i + 1. With an inbound cost of materials c, stage i + 1 will choose her transfer price w so as to maximize her profits, anticipating the order quantity of the downstream stages, that is,
Because the stage wants to maximize its profits, it will offer w = p F Q 1 − l Q i−1 , and choose the induced level of inventory Q to maximize p F Q 1 − g Q i−1 − c Q. Differentiating the profit function with respect to Q, and using the fact that g Q is increasing (because of the IGFR property), we obtain that p F Q 1 − g Q i − c ≥ 0, completing the induction step.
Proof of Theorem 2. The proof is based on Lemmas 3-5 in the appendix. The bound (A1) in Lemma 5 is decreasing with . From Lemma 2, ≥ r/ 1 − g Q n−1 . Replacing with r/ 1 − k n−1 in (A1), we obtain an increasing function of k, attaining its maximum when F Q d = 1, i.e., when k = 1 − r 1/ n−1 . Note that because the worst-case distribution is Pareto, the inequality in Lemma 1 is tight in the worst case.
Proof of Theorem 3. The proof is based on Lemmas 3-5 in the appendix. In Lemma 5, the worst-case distribution is such that
Replacing with r 1 + k into upper bound (A1) simplifies the PoA to 1 + k 1/k − 1 − k / 1 − k , which is decreasing with k and is maximized when k tends to zero.
Proof of Lemma 2. The proof is by induction, by moving downstream along the supply chain. With only two stages, the claim holds at equality by (4).
For the induction, assume that, if the supply stage consists of i stages and has a unit selling price w, the level of inventory in the supply chain satisfies F Q ≥ c/w · 1 + l Q i−1 . Consider now the stage downstream of the supply chain, i.e., stage i + 1. With a unit selling price p, stage i + 1 will choose a transfer price w in order to maximize her profits, anticipating the level of inventory in the upstream supply chain, that is,
Because the stage wants to maximize its profits, it will offer w = c/ F Q 1 + l Q i−1 , and choose the induced level of inventory Q to maximize
Differentiating the profit function with respect to Q, and using the fact that l Q is increasing (because of the IGFR property), we obtain that p F Q −c 1+ l Q i ≥ 0, completing the induction step.
Proof of Theorem 4. The proof is based on Lemmas 3-5 in the appendix. The bound (A1) in Lemma 5 is decreasing with . From Lemma 2, ≥ r 1 + l Q n−1 . With the distribution that attains the upper bound (A1),
Replacing with r 1 + k n−1 in (A1), we obtain a decreasing function of k, which is maximized when k tends to 0. Because k → 0, the inequality in Lemma 2 is tight with the worst-case distribution.
Proof of Theorem 5. Using (5), we replace with r/ 1 − kn in (A1) of Lemma 5. The resulting upper bound is increasing with k and maximized when k = 1 − r /n (because F Q d = r/ 1 − kn ≤ 1), leading to the theorem statement. Proof. Let us decompose the function as follows
The first term is a concave function of C n . A sufficient condition for the second term to be concave is that each term To complete the proof, we need to show that the determinant of the Hessian is nonnegative. It is equal to zero when C i−1 = C i . Suppose now that it is equal to zero for some C i−1 and let us show that the derivative with respect to C i−1 is negative. If this is true, then the determinant is nonnegative.
The derivative of the determinant with respect to C i−1 is equal to which is nonpositive if f x F x / f x 2 is nondecreasing, because C i−1 ≤ C i .
Proof of Theorem 6. Lemma 3 showed that the distribution that minimizes n with the proposed piecewise Pareto distribution. To simplify the exposition, we remove the superscript d, as all quantities refer to the decentralized case.
Consider supplier 1. Let us fix F C 1 = and g C 1 = k. Using Lemma 3, the distribution that minimizes C 1 0 F x dx is Pareto with a generalized failure rate converging to zero. With that distribution, C 1 0 F x dx = C 1 , and the first-order optimality condition for C 1 simplifies to F C 1 = F C 2 · 1 + k = F C 2 1 + k 0 1 . Let us consider supplier i ≤ n and fix F C i = and g C i = k. By induction hypothesis, the distribution between 0 and C i−1 is piecewise Pareto, with breakpoints at C j , j ≤ i − 1; the generalized failure rates of all pieces, except the last one, tend to zero, and the convergence to zero is faster on the pieces associated with lower values. Accordingly, On the other hand, the first-order condition for optimality simplifies to
Taking the limit when l goes to zero simplifies the firstorder condition to F C i = F C i+1 1 + k i−1 1 because lim l→0 1 + xl −1/l = e −x , preserving the induction hypothesis for the next supplier.
Proof of Theorem 7. In Lemma 5, the worst-case distribution is such that f x → 0 and F x → F Q d , for x < Q d . Accordingly, (7) reduces to F Q d 1 − g Q d /n = r. Replacing with r/ 1 − k/n in upper bound (A1), we obtain an increasing function of k. Because F Q d ≤ 1, k ≤ 1 − r n. Replacing k with its upper bound in the ratio gives rise to the theorem statement.
Proof of Theorem 8. Using (8), we replace with r/ 1 − k/n in (A1) of Lemma 5. The resulting upper bound is increasing with k and maximized when k = 1 − r n (because r/ 1 − k/n = F Q d ≤ 1), leading to the theorem statement.
Proof of Theorem 9. In Lemma 5, the worst-case distribution is such that
Thus, optimality condition (9) simplifies to F Q d = r 1 + nk , where k = g Q d . Replacing with r 1 + nk into upper bound (A1) simplifies the PoA to 1−kn 1/k − 1−kn / n 1−k , which is decreasing with k and is then maximized when k → 0.
